Park M., Cho R.M. Examining the effects of the Durunuri programme on low-wage workers' social insurance coverage in South Korea This study examined the effects of the Durunuri programme in Korea, a Making Work Pay policy initiated in 2012 that subsidises social insurance contributions of low-wage workers in workplaces with fewer than 10 employees. Using a nationally representative sample of Korean low-wage workers between the years 2010 and 2015, the study employs a difference-in-differences method to isolate the effect of the Durunuri programme on workers' subscription rate to the national pension and employment insurance programmes. Results indicated that, compared with ineligible low-wage workers in workplaces with 10 or more but fewer than 30 employees, eligible low-wage workers in workplaces with fewer than 10 employees were found to experience an increase in the odds of being subscribed to both the national pension and employment insurance programmes during the first, second and third year following implementation of the Durunuri programme. Policy implications as well as future policy modifications are further discussed.
Previous research has emphasised the role of government in resolving social problems such as unemployment and poverty; thus, many countries have attempted to solve such problems through various governmental mechanisms (Marx, Vanhille, & Verbist, 2012) . Public assistance programmes are one type of such policies aiming to alleviate poverty through the provision of financial support. However, provision of generous assistance when out of work has been criticised for reducing work incentives and thus increasing welfare dependency.
As an alternative, 'Making work pay' (MWP) policies have been introduced not only to reduce poverty but also to boost work incentives and decrease unemployment rates. Specifically, various types of MWP policies have been advocated for, and implemented to address, these issues in OECD countries in recent years (Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, & Orsini, 2010; Dagsvik, Jia, Orsini, & Van Camp, 2011; Van der Linden, 2016) .
MWP policies are generally targeted at people who face the highest unemployment risks (Bargain et al., 2010) . Typical MWP policies are workfare programmes that provide work incentives and maintain certain levels of social protection. The goal is to boost the incomes of poor families while simultaneously enhancing the incentive to work. As a result, MWP policy instruments generally take on the form of tax credits on low earnings as well as subsidies on social security contribution. Examples of the former include the earned income tax credit (EITC) in the USA, Working Families' Tax Credit in the UK, while examples of the latter include 'mini-jobs' in Germany and the Work Bonus in Belgium.
The aim of the present study was to evaluate a recent MWP policy in South Korea (hereinafter, Korea) called the Durunuri programme, which subsidises the social security contribution fees of lowwage employees working in small businesses. The Durunuri programme was the second MWP policy implemented in Korea in July 2012, followed by the EITC in 2009. Although MWP policies are typically introduced in the Western context to address concerns related to low employment of the low-skilled (Van der Linden, 2016) , the purpose of the Durunuri programme was slightly different. That is, issues of unemployment were less of a concern regarding the Korean low-skilled population where employment rates of those with less than a high school diploma are generally higher than their college graduate counterparts. 1 Rather, a key social issue over the past couple of decades regarding the low-skilled has been the lack of social protection provided to this group challenging the provision of a minimum level of welfare for all. To address such limitations, the primary policy goal of the Durunuri programme was to extend coverage of social insurance programmes to the lowskilled population who were particularly at risk of being excluded by reducing both employers' and employees' social contribution fees (Yoo, Kang, & Choi, 2016) . Other secondary goals of the programme included promoting the transition of informal labour to the formal sector, increasing the employment rate of low-wage workers and redistributing income, thereby improving the well-being of lowwage workers and their employers in small businesses (Yoo, Kang, & Choi, 2013) .
As mentioned above, low coverage of social insurance programmes in Korea is not a problem uniform across all groups of workers (Koh, 2015) . Rather, employees with non-standard employment and those in small firms have been found to be particularly vulnerable to such risks (Cho, Kim, & Kwon, 2008; Koh, 2015) . Scholars have long criticised the government for tolerating such employer practices through weak enforcement of laws as well as through excluding non-standard workers from social insurancerelated regulations (Cho et al., 2008; Seo & Back, 2014 ). Yet, minimum access to social protection among the disadvantaged is a phenomenon common in societies that are characterised by welfare ideologies such as 'welfare developmentalism' or 'productivist welfare capitalism'. These terms have been frequently used to describe the Korean welfare state, especially during the periods of economic development in the 1980s and 1990s (Holliday, 2000; Kwon & Holliday, 2007) . In productivist welfare regimes, social policy is essentially a means for economic growth and is subordinate to economic objectives (Holliday, 2000) . Naturally, such societies develop social policies that prioritise the productive sectors and use social investment strategies to strengthen human capital development, often resulting in the neglect of its most disadvantaged population.
Recently, however, based on the recognition that guaranteed universal access to social insurance programmes is necessary if all members of society are to have a social safety net, various policy options have been reviewed in Korea. As a result, the Durunuri programme was initiated as a pilot project in 16 regions across the country in February of 2012, and nationwide implementation followed several months later in July of 2012 (Kim, 2016; Yoo et al., 2013) . Using empirical data on a large nationally representative sample between the years 2010 and 2015, the present study examined the effectiveness of a subsidy programme (i.e., the Durunuri) on improving the level of social protection provided to society's most vulnerable population. The study employed a quasi-experimental evaluation method to examine whether the Durunuri programme had attained its primary goal of increasing low-wage workers' subscription rate to the national pension and employment insurance programmes. Results from this study should provide a more complete understanding of recent changes in Korean social policies which can assist policymakers and practitioners design and implement programmes that can be used as a potential lever to improve outcomes for disadvantaged groups.
Background

Social investment perspective in Korea
As mentioned above, disparity in coverage of social insurance programmes among workers is strongly related to the 'productivist' nature of the Korean welfare state where the goal of economic growth is prioritised over other objectives when setting social policy (Holliday, 2000; Kwon & Holliday, 2007) . The productivist welfare ideology is not unique to Korea, rather it is a concept that was developed by academics in comparative social policy to better understand the welfare systems in East Asia's highgrowth economies such as Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan (Aspalter, 2006; Holliday, 2000) . According to the East Asian welfare model, productivist welfare states typically demonstrate high spending on health and education, but tend to underdevelop their income maintenance programmes, reinforcing the position of productive elements in society (Gough, 2000) . A key feature of the productivist welfare regime is, therefore, its targeted public investment approach in social affairs (i.e., the social investment approach) to promote national and economic development (Aspalter, 2006; Gough, 2000) .
In the context of Korea, such ideology has been manifested primarily through the development of social insurance programmes the objectives of which were to benefit productive sectors of the economy with a high reliance on the private sector for service delivery (Kwon & Holliday, 2007 programmes were designed to be contribution-based rather than tax-based, and introduced in a series of phases, first covering public sector employees and workers in large enterprises before being extended to the rest of the population. This targeted approach naturally resulted in the concentration of benefits to the skilled, male, industrial core workers (Peng, 2014) . However, following the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and more recently with the emergence of various socioeconomic problems such as increased income inequality, low fertility rate and an ageing population, the politics of welfare expansion has been noticeable (Choi, 2012) . Specifically, in the past couple of decades, Korea has witnessed an extension of coverage and benefits to social security programmes as well as the implementation of new social services including childcare programmes and long-term care insurance for the elderly. Scholars have been debating whether these recent expansions in social policy since the early 2000s, which is not limited to Korea but observed in other East Asian countries, imply a diversion from the productivist welfare capitalism approach (Aspalter, 2006; Choi, 2012; Kwon & Holliday, 2007) . It has become clear that the targets of Korean social investment have expanded and shifted to include more peripheral, marginalised and vulnerable populations in hopes of addressing various socioeconomic issues (Choi, 2012; Peng, 2014) . Implementing policies that can increase both social and economic sustainability has become more of an important policy goal to the Korean government than ever before.
Korea's recent adoption of MWP policies -EITC and Durunuri social insurance programme -can be understood from this perspective, where the social investment approach is used not only to incentivise labour market participation, but also to promote social inclusion and intergenerational equity of the low-skilled population.
The Durunuri social insurance programme
In the past couple of decades, the need for universal access to social security programmes has been elevated in Korea. Specifically, following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Korea experienced unprecedented high unemployment climbing up to 7-8% which, despite falling quite rapidly, never returned to its previously very low levels of 2-3% (Kwon & Holliday, 2007) . Measures taken to increase employment flexibility in the labour market, which was a condition for the financial bailout programme of the International Monetary Fund, resulted in a dramatic increase in the share of non-standard workers who were generally not covered by social security programmes (Shin, 2014) . The Korean government responded to such problems by expanding the coverage of social insurance programmes (Kwon & Holliday, 2007; Shin, 2014) . The direction of such extensions moved from limited coverage of civil servants and employees in large firms to all firms with fewer employees (Cho et al. 2008) . As a result, by 2003, each of the four major social insurance programmes in Korea including the industrial accident compensation insurance, the national health insurance, the national pension, and the employment insurance legally mandated all workers in workplaces with one or more persons to be included in its statutory coverage (Seo & Back, 2014) .
Despite such efforts to expand coverage, exclusion from actual coverage still exists today. Given that these programmes protect only those members who contribute to the system, workers who cannot afford to pay their bills are not eligible to receive benefits. Currently, the majority of Korean workers are gaining benefits from social security; however, workers in small-sized enterprises are at greater risk of not being covered. According to reports on Labour Statistics by Employment Types (available at http://laborstat.moel. go.kr) in 2015, the enrolment rates of insured workers were found to vary by employment status (see Table 1 ). Among those who were eligible for social insurance coverage, the overall average rate of insured workers was above 88%, yet more than 95% of those insured workers were standard (i.e., regular) employees. Regarding standard (i.e., regular) employees, the enrolment rate in industrial accident pension insurance was the highest (98%) and the rates for other schemes were as follows: national health insurance (97.9%), national pension (97.8%) and employment insurance (95.4%). However, for non-standard employees, although the enrolment rate in industrial accident compensation insurance was high (96.4%), the rates for the other three remaining social insurance programmes varied from 53 to 67%. These numbers imply that there is still a substantial portion of workers, especially among the nonstandard employees, who are legally eligible for social insurance coverage but are not actually being provided such services. It should also be noted that the coverage rate decreases drastically when one examines the total population of workers, including those who are not legally eligible for benefits due to age or employment-type restrictions. For example, in 2015, among all workers in Korea, the total enrolment rate in the national pension was 82% for standard employees but only 36.9% for non-standard employees, whereas for employment insurance it was 82.4% for standard employees versus 42.5% for nonstandard employees.
2
In addition to employment type, company size makes a huge difference, as employees in smaller companies with lower wages are not accruing benefits from the social security network (Kim, Go, & Song, 2015) . Table 2 shows that, in 2015, eligible workers in firms with fewer than five employees are discriminated against regarding coverage under social insurance compared to large firms with 300 employees or more. Only 69.4% of eligible workers in firms with fewer than five employees were covered by the employment insurance (as opposed to 96.8% in firms with 300 employees or more), 68.9% by the national health insurance (as opposed to 99.7% in firms with 300 employees or more) and 69.5% by the national pension (as opposed to 99.5% in firms with 300 employees or more). As Shin (2014) argues, a large gap exists between statutory coverage and actual coverage among small firms because employers of micro-enterprises are reluctant to pay social contributions for their employees in hopes of minimising labour costs. This implies that the working poor are rarely covered by social insurance programmes through their workplace in the Korean context (Kim & Lee, 2012) .
The divide in working conditions between large versus small-and medium-sized firms can be attributed to the segmentation of the Korean labour market. That is, since the 1997 crisis, labour market dualism has become more pronounced in Korea with regular (i.e., standard) workers in large firms coexisting with highly flexible irregular (i.e., non-standard) workers in mostly small-and medium-sized firms (Shin, 2014) . The presence of strong union affiliation in large firms with collective agreements and weak or no union affiliation in small-and medium-sized firms also contributes to this dualism. As a result, compared to workers in small-and medium-sized firms, employees of large firms tend to enjoy relatively high wages, favourable employment conditions and full social security coverage.
As a way to resolve the problem of low-skilled workers' exclusion from social insurance programmes, the Korean government launched the Durunuri programme in July 2012 which subsidised up to 50% of both the employer and employee contribution fees for the membership of the national pension and employment insurance programmes. Providing incentives for low-skilled workers and their employers to enrol in the national pension and employment insurance programmes was seen as a necessary policy measure since it would allow the working poor to maintain a minimum level of old-age security and access unemployment benefits which could keep them from falling into absolute poverty (Shin, 2014) . Given that social insurance subscription rates showed huge variations with regard to wage level and workplace size, the government restricted the eligibility of the Durunuri programme to low-wage workers employed in small businesses with fewer than 10 employees. In the first year of implementation, only businesses with employees earning a salary of 1,250,000 KRW (equivalent to 1,165.66 US dollars using 26 February 2018 exchange rate) per month or below were supported, and the rate of financial aid was differentiated up to a maximum of 50% subsidisation in contribution fees. However, in January 2014, the programme broadened the target group by increasing the salary threshold to include businesses with employees earning a monthly salary of 1,300,000 KRW or below, while the rate of aid was raised to a fixed rate of 50% in April 2013. The monthly salary threshold continued to increase gradually over the years to the point that, in 2014, the eligibility of monthly salary was increased slightly to 1,350,000 KRW and by January 2015 it became 1,400,000 KRW. In addition, in 2014, the subsidisation rate of contribution fees was no longer differentiated and everyone eligible received 50%, whereas in 2016 the subsidisation rate became differentiated again, with new members receiving 60% and existing members receiving 40%. Most recently from January 2018, the new administration has drastically increased benefits for the working poor by revising the monthly salary threshold from 1,400,000 KRW to 1,900,000 KRW. Additionally, the subsidisation rate was increased to 90% (or 80%) for new members employed in businesses with fewer than five (or five or more but fewer than 10) employees, but the subsidisation rate of 40% was maintained for existing members.
In addition to the above-mentioned financial incentives, the government took several measures to increase participation, such as promoting public awareness of the Durunuri programme and continuously monitoring its take-up rate. A website was created specifically for the Durunuri programme (http:// insurancesupport.or.kr), and to ensure that information was easily accessible, online cartoons and guidebooks were produced. Both the National Pension Service (http://www.nps.or.kr) and the Korea Workers' Compensation & Welfare Service (https:// www.kcomwel.or.kr) provide in-person site visits to any eligible employee's workplace inquiring about the programme. Furthermore, these public corporations cooperate with local governments and organisations regularly by hosting contests or awarding businesses that honour best practices in expanding social insurance coverage of the Durunuri programme (Korea Workers' Compensation & Welfare Services Press Release, 2015 .
The Durunuri programme quickly became a major policy in the Ministry of Employment and Labour with an annual budget of roughly a quarter (i.e., 25.2%) of the total annual budget for the entire Ministry in 2016 (Kim, 2016) . The budget grew annually from 0.2654 trillion KRW in 2012-0.5904 trillion KRW in 2015, and slightly decreased in 2016 -0.5202 trillion KRW because of the differentiated rate scheme between new and existing members. Of course, the annual budget is expected to increase significantly in 2018, given the revisions to both eligibility and benefit levels.
In Table 3 , among workplaces with fewer than 10 workers, the number of workplaces and workers subscribed to the national pension and employment insurance programmes is presented from 2010 to 2014. Given that the Durunuri programme was implemented in 2012, it is important to see if membership rates changed during the pre-post implementation years. As is shown, both the number of workplaces and workers covered by the two social insurance programmes increased following the implementation of the Durunuri programme. However, it is difficult to argue that such observed progress is due only to the Durunuri programme since there have been consistent efforts on part of the government to boost the rate of subscription to social insurance programmes in general, as well as other idiosyncratic factors that have not been controlled for. Therefore, to measure the effectiveness of the Durunuri programme, it is important to separate the true effect of the Durunuri programme from any natural increase of participants due to other factors, such as timing effects.
Despite the expansion of the Durunuri social insurance programme in recent years, extant literature examining its effect has been limited (Choi & Cho, 2014; Yoo et al., 2016) . That is, only a few studies have discussed the Durunuri programme and the effect of the Durunuri pilot project (Choi & Cho, 2014; Yoo et al., 2016) . Specifically, Yoo et al. (2016) evaluated the effects of the Durunuri pilot project and the effects of the actual programme on a worker's probability to become employed as well as join the employment insurance and national pension programmes. Estimates using the difference-indifferences (DID) method suggested that the pilot programme increased the number of the national employment insurance subscribers by 2.4% and that of the national pension subscribers by 3.1%, while it failed to affect employment. They also analysed the effects of the actual programme implemented from July to December of 2012 (over 6 months) and found that it had increased the number of employment insurance subscribers by 2.68% and that of national pension subscribers by 2.04%, while it had no effect on employment. Choi & Cho (2014) compared the national pension subscription rate of workers in small businesses with fewer than 10 employees prior to the Durunuri programme implementation and after implementation and found that subscription rates had increased by 31.3% from July to December of 2012 as compared with the period between July and December of 2011. Choi & Cho (2014) argued that the findings suggested that the Durunuri programme could have played an important role in encouraging employers and workers of small businesses with fewer than 10 employees to become new members of the national pension programme despite acknowledging that the increase in subscription rate may not be entirely due to Durunuri. Although research conducted by Yoo et al. (2016) and Choi & Cho (2014) provide interesting findings, they both have limitations in that they analysed the short-run effects (i.e., 6 months) of the Durunuri programme. In addition, Choi & Cho (2014) was not able to control for temporal effects or unobserved characteristics that may have influenced one's chances of enrolling in the national pension programme since it simply compared pre-post changes in the number of subscribers. In the present analyses, we attempt to overcome the shortcomings of extant research by using recent data and employing a rigorous methodology to control for a number of confounding factors.
Research design
Model and method
This study utilised the DID method, a quasiexperimental model, to analyse the effects of the Durunuri social insurance programme. DID is commonly employed to assess the effectiveness of a policy by comparing the change in outcomes before and after its intervention across a group affected by the policy (i.e., treatment group) and a non-equivalent comparison group not affected by the policy. Therefore, in this study, changes in subscription status of eligible Durunuri beneficiaries in the national pension and employment insurance programmes are compared with changes in subscription status of non-eligible Durunuri beneficiaries. The disparities between the two are considered as the effect of the Durunuri programme.
The DID method is able to measure the effect of policy intervention effect precisely by controlling for individual characteristics and other factors that are correlated to the treatment group variable as well as the outcome variable. Below, in equation (1), the effect of the Durunuri programme is estimated using logistic regression as follows:
The dependent variables used to estimate the effect of the Durunuri programme are the subscription status to the national pension programme and the employment insurance programme -1 if subscribed and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Treated i takes the value of 0 if the employee is ineligible for the Durunuri programme, and 1 otherwise. That is, given that only low-wage workers in workplaces with fewer than 10 employees are eligible for the Durunuri programme, workers in workplaces with more than 10 employees are treated as the comparison group in this design. To construct an appropriate comparison group, the present study relied on the definition of small businesses/enterprises in the Korean context as well as data availability. According to the Korean Ministry of Small & Medium Enterprises and Startups (www.mss.go.kr), small businesses are defined as either microenterprises or small-sized enterprises where the former includes workplaces with fewer than 10 employees and the latter includes workplaces with 10 or more but fewer than 50 employees. 3 In addition, information on workplace size was collected as a categorical variable: (i) 1-4 persons; (ii) 5-9 persons; (iii) 10-29 persons; (iv) 30-99 persons; (v) 100-299 persons; and (vi) 300 or more persons -in the Economically Active Population Survey in March, as described in the following Data section. Therefore, the current study employed a comparison group composed of workers in small-sized enterprises with 10 or more but fewer than 30 employees. In addition, as explained above, the monthly salary threshold for Durunuri eligibility changed quite frequently since its implementation in 2012, and therefore, individuals in both the treatment and , 2010, 2011 and 2012) . 4 In this model, b 1 indicates any change in the level of the outcome variables between the two groups following the implementation of the Durunuri programme in years 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively. X i is a vector of demographic characteristics including gender, age, education level, marital status and household income. Lastly, we control for year fixed effects (i.e., P 2015 t52011 D t ) to capture any economic, social or policy factors that are common to a given year from 2010 to 2015. A detailed description of the variables included in equation (1) is presented in Table 4 .
Data
The data set used for this study is the Economically Active Population Survey in March collected by the Office of Statistics in Korea. This survey is conducted to investigate Koreans' economic activities (i.e., employment, unemployment, labour force, etc.) using a nationally representative sample and to provide basic data needed for the development of macroeconomic policy and research. The Economically Active Population Survey has been conducted annually every March since 1963 as a repeated crosssectional survey.
The final sample of this study can be divided into individuals who are in the treatment group versus those in the comparison group. Given that the Durunuri programme's target population is low-wage workers, the study excluded individuals in the Economically Active Population Survey who were observed to earn more than the monthly income threshold as prescribed by the government. Specifically, the low-wage threshold varied across the sampling period: (i) those who earn a monthly income less than 1,250,000 KRW (from 2010 to 2012); (ii) those who earn a monthly income less than 1,300,000 KRW (from 2013 to 2014); and (iii) those who earn a monthly income less than 1,400,000 KRW in 2015. Treatment group members included low-wage workers from businesses with fewer than 10 employees between 2010 and 2015. The comparison group included low-wage workers in workplaces with more than 10 and fewer than 30 employees. The final sample included 39,410 individuals.
The characteristics of the study sample by year are presented in Table 5 . For example, in 2015, there were 4,252 individuals in the treatment group (i.e., low-wage workers in workplaces with fewer than 10 employees) and 1,529 individuals in the comparison group (i.e., low-wage workers in workplaces with 10 or more but fewer than 30 employees). The proportion of females in the sample increased from 68.4% in 2010 to 70.8% in 2015, and the mean age of sample individuals was 49.33 in 2015. The disproportionately high representation of females in the study sample, as compared with males, reflects the relative disadvantage of women in the Korean labour market, i.e., women are more likely than men to be employed in small-and medium-sized firms as non-standard (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) workers. In 2015, the proportion of high school graduates was the highest among sample individuals at 44.5%, followed by middle school or lower educated people at 36.3%, university graduates at 11.1% and college graduates at 8.0%, married people constituted 61.4% of the sample and the average monthly income is reported to be 854,500 KRW; and finally, the overall rate of subscription to the national pension programme and the employment insurance programme is only 26.1% and 33.5%, respectively.
Results
Descriptive statistics: comparability between the treatment and comparison groups
To explore the comparability of individuals in the treatment versus the comparison groups, we statistically tested for differences across groups in terms of a number of observed characteristics. Results from the intergroup differences are presented in Table 6 . First, as is shown in Table 6 , low-wage workers in workplaces with fewer than 10 employees (i.e., treatment group) appeared to be statistically significantly different from low-wage workers in workplaces with 10 or more but fewer than 30 employees (i.e., first comparison group) in terms of all characteristics at the 5% significance level. Specifically, the proportion of individuals in the treatment group who participated in the national pension programme was only 18.4%, whereas the proportion of individuals in the comparison group who participated in the national pension programme was 43.6%. Similarly, the proportion of individuals in the treatment group who participated in the employment insurance programme was 22.2%, whereas the proportion of participants in the comparison group, at 49.1%, was more than double that rate. These estimates indicate that the scale of business affects the membership status of the national pension and employment insurance programmes, i.e., low-wage workers in the treatment group were indeed disadvantaged in terms of social insurance coverage as compared with lowwage workers in the comparison group. These results are consistent with Kim et al.'s (2015) argument stating that most employees working for smaller businesses are not protected by the social safety net in Korea.
Next, regarding gender, it appears that female employees outnumbered male employees regardless of the size of the company. Female workers comprised more than two-thirds of the treatment group (69.9%) as well as of the comparison group (71.1%). This is consistent with observations that, in Korea, monthly income of female workers is lower than that of male workers, and employment instability is relatively higher. Individuals in the treatment group were slightly younger than those in the comparison group. Regarding education levels, high school graduates constituted the highest proportion in both groups (41.9-44.4%) followed by middle school or less (37.5-39.8%). The proportion of individuals with tertiary education levels did not vary much across the two groups. Overall, the difference in education level across groups was relatively small. Lastly, low-wage workers in the treatment group were less likely to be married and had lower average monthly income as compared with those in the comparison group.
Finally, given the observed differences between low-wage workers in workplaces with fewer than 10 employees (i.e., treatment group) versus low-wage workers in workplaces with 10 or more but fewer than 30 employees (i.e., the comparison group), we attempted to quantify the comparability across these groups by estimating one's propensity to become eligible for the Durunuri programme. That is, to further examine whether individuals in the treatment group are indeed comparable to those in the comparison group in terms of observed characteristics, the nonparametric kernel density estimate of one's propensity to work in a workplace with fewer than 10 employees was estimated. The propensity scores were obtained from logistic regression models controlling for gender, age, education level, marital status, household income and a set of interactions and higher order terms of variables included to satisfy the balancing property. Results are presented in Figure 1 . As is shown in Figure 1 , the estimated propensity scores for the treatment group is slightly higher than those for the comparison group indicating that individuals in the treatment group are more likely to be eligible for the Durunuri programme. However, despite such small differences, the overlap in propensity scores between the treatment group and the comparison group demonstrates the existence of a wide area of common support. The similarity in their estimated propensity scores gives us a minimum assurance that although individuals in the treatment and comparison groups were found to be statistically significantly different from each other in Table 6 , comparison between the two groups after controlling for such observed differences shall render meaningful results.
Descriptive statistics: outcome variable
Change in membership rates of those enrolled in the national pension and employment insurance programmes by treatment group status are displayed in Figure 1 . Non-parametric Kernel Density Estimates of the propensity scores for being employed in a workplace with fewer than 10 employees. Note: The propensity scores are estimated by a logistic model controlling for the following variables: gender, age, age 3 age, education level, marital status, gender 3 marital status, income, and income 3 income. In operating the logistic model, the balancing property is applied. Similarly, membership rates in the employment insurance programme displayed divergent patterns during the sampling time period for the treatment and comparison group workers. For workers in the treatment group, membership rates in the employment insurance programme were slightly increasing prior to the implementation of the Durunuri programme from 15.4% in 2010 to 16.2% in 2012. This trend did not change with the passage of the Durunuri programme and the subscription rate continued to increase from 16.3% in 2013 to 17.3% in 2015. However, the rate of subscription for workers in the comparison group actually declined during the same time period from 14.5% in 2010 to 13.5% in 2012 and continued to drop following the implementation of the Durunuri programme from 12.7% in 2013 to 11.8% in 2014 and 13.0% in 2015. Although the rate of subscription increased for those in the comparison group in 2015, it was still much lower than the rate displayed by workers in the treatment group. These raw differences across groups imply that the Durunuri programme may have helped prevent low-wage workers in the treatment group from losing coverage in both the national pension and employment insurance programmes during the years following Durunuri implementation. In the following section, we estimate the DID estimator to examine whether the Durunuri programme actually improved the social insurance coverage rate of workers in the treatment group controlling for observed differences.
Effects of Durunuri on the national pension and employment insurance subscription rates
The results from estimating equation (1) using logistic regressions are presented in Table 7 . The odds ratio of increasing the independent variable by one unit is obtained by exponentiating the coefficient of logistic regressions (i.e., exp(b)). The odds ratio of the Durunuri variable in the current study is literally the ratio of odds of two distinct states (i.e., treatment vs. comparison group status) and can be interpreted as follows: odds ratio of value 1 indicates that there is no difference in the outcome variable between the treatment and comparison groups; odds ratio greater than 1 indicates that the treatment group has a higher value in the outcome than the comparison group; and odds ratio less than 1 indicates that the comparison group has a higher value in outcome than the treatment group.
As is presented in columns (1) and (2), the Durunuri programme increased low-wage workers' subscription rates in both the national pension and employment insurance programmes. Specifically, the odds ratio of subscribing to the national pension and employment insurance programmes for workers in the treatment group were found to be as high as 16.5% and 16.0%, respectively, 1 year after the implementation of the Durunuri programme compared with those in the Figure 2 . Change in the membership rate of the national pension and employment insurance programmes by treatment group status. Note: The annual membership rate of the treatment group is calculated by dividing the number of low-wage workers in businesses with fewer than 10 employees who are subscribed to the insurance programme in a given year by the total number of low-wage workers in businesses with fewer than 10 employees in that given year. Likewise, the annual membership rate of the comparison group is calculated by dividing the number of low-wage workers in businesses with more than 10 and fewer than 30 employees who are subscribed to the insurance programme in a given year by the total number of low-wage workers in businesses with more than 10 and fewer than 30 employees in that given year.
comparison group. These estimates are marginally significant at the 10% level. Following the first year of implementation, however, both the effect size and statistical significance of the estimates increased. That is, in the second year after implementation of the Durunuri programme, the odds ratio of subscribing to the national pension and employment insurance programmes for workers in the treatment group was estimated to be as high as 26.6% and 17.5%, respectively, compared with those in the comparison group. Similarly, during the third year after implementation of the Durunuri programme, the odds ratio of subscribing to the national pension and employment insurance programmes for workers in the treatment group was estimated to be as high as 29.2% and 24.3%, respectively, compared with those in the comparison group. In addition, control variables such as gender, age, education level, marital status and monthly income were all found to significantly influence the subscription rate to the social insurance programmes in expected directions. That is, being male, younger, having higher levels of education, being married and having higher income levels were associated with greater likelihood of being enrolled in both the national pension and employment insurance programmes. In sum, results suggest that the Durunuri programme has a positive impact on subscription rates to the national pension and employment insurance programmes, consistent with findings from extant studies (Choi & Cho, 2014; Kim, 2014; Yoo et al., 2016) .
Discussion and conclusion
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of the Durunuri programme in Korea, a MWP policy that subsidises social insurance contributions of both low-wage workers and their employers. The study employed a treatment and comparison group strategy in estimating the effects of the Durunuri programme on the subscription to national pension and employment insurance programmes. Findings revealed that the Durunuri programme had a positive effect on increasing low-wage workers' social insurance coverage. The major analytical results of this study were as follows:
First, our investigation confirmed that, compared with low-wage workers in businesses with 10 or more but fewer than 30 employees, low-wage workers in businesses with fewer than 10 employees were found to experience a 16.5, 26.6 and 29.2% increase in the odds of being subscribed to the national pension programme during the first, second and third year, respectively, following implementation of the Durunuri programme. Second, compared with low-wage workers in businesses with 10 or more but fewer than 30 employees, low-wage workers in businesses with fewer than 10 employees were found to experience a 16.0, 17.5 and 24.4% increase in the odds of being subscribed to the employment insurance programme during the first, second and third year, respectively, following implementation of the Durunuri programme. Such findings imply that Durunuri succeeded as a policy tool to increase the social insurance coverage of one of the most disadvantaged labour force groups in Korea. Of course, it should be noted that such a conclusion is based on the assumption that eligibility rules were met, and therefore, the Durunuri programme benefits were provided to the truly deserving low-wage workers who are the program target population. However, given some recent reports of employers underreporting employees' salaries to reduce the financial burden of social insurance contribution fees (particularly national pension contributions), one cannot preclude the possibility that Durunuri programme benefits may have been extended to workers with actual wages higher than stipulated by eligibility rules (Park, 2011) . From a practical viewpoint, additional efforts to accurately identify the target population should be necessary. It should also be important to verify to what extent employers have illegally benefited from the Durunuri programme in future research.
There are a couple of key limitations of our study. First, the data set used in the present study, Economically Active Population Survey, is a repeated crosssectional survey which collects information on individual economic activity every year. Since individuals are not followed across time, it is impossible to estimate change in behaviour relative to a certain point in time. This means that we cannot examine whether an individual joined the national pension and employment insurance programmes following the passage of the Durunuri programme, nor can we investigate individual patterns of moving in and out of such programmes. In addition, although we find strong evidence relating the Durunuri programme and an increase in social insurance coverage, we are cautious to make strong causal inferences. This is due to the limited number of covariates in our data sets which we could control for; therefore, differences in both observable and unobservable characteristics may remain between the treatment and comparison groups. However, as we show in Figure 1 , there is considerable overlap in propensity scores between the two groups indicating that our evaluation strategy is valid. It would be useful for future research to employ additional rigorous evaluation methods to confirm our finding and move us closer to understanding the causal effect of the Durunuri programme.
Given the economic context of Korea, a nation with relatively low rates of social insurance coverage for its working poor, findings from the present study indicate that government subsidisation of social insurance programmes may be an effective tool to reduce the low-wage workers' risks of falling into absolute poverty (Kim, 2016) . That is, from a theoretical standpoint, these results confirm that an inclusive approach to social investment, including not only the productive sector but also vulnerable populations, produces favourable results. Specifically, as beneficiaries of the Durunuri programme, the lowskilled shall become eligible for benefits during periods of unemployment and receive pension funds in old age. Given that the majority of low-wage employees in small businesses tend to be non-standard workers with insecure jobs, being enrolled in these types of social security programmes should be vital for their current and future well-being. Research has extensively documented that social insurance coverage is important for building a social security net for the poor in Korea. For example, according to Seok (2010) , the poverty rate of elderly Korean households declined by 23.3% after receiving public pensions. Kang (2011) also found that the national pension programme had a large and significant effect on reducing poverty but that the magnitude of the effects varied by age group 2 workers in their 40s were observed to experience larger effects than those in their 50s and 30s. Given the recent expansions in the Durunuri programme to include a larger population of the lowskilled, future research should focus on examining the long-term sustainability of this programme in terms of consolidating work and welfare, thereby creating a balance between social and economic goals.
Next, results from the study raise questions around the issue of equity in eligibility for the Durunuri programme. As is explained, the Durunuri programme has two strict eligibility requirements: the monthly salary of individuals and workplace size. Use of means-tested schemes in providing welfare benefits is quite common in Korea, and therefore, the first requirement did not raise much controversy. However, the validity of the second requirement, workplace size, has sparked controversy from its very inception, and the question of whether restricting benefits only to low-wage workers in firms below a certain size is reasonable has been raised since. That is, initially, in 2011, during the early stages of planning, the government had proposed to impose a much more limited provision criterion of the Durunuri programme related to concerns about high costs of the programme. Specifically, the government had planned to provide subsidies only to low-wage employees in firms with fewer than five employees and to cap the maximum benefit level to one third (rather than half) of contribution fees (Kim, 2016) . However, during the 2012 congressional budget review process, both the level of benefit and target groups were expanded, and additional funds were allotted to implement the current programme (Kim, 2016) . To this day, debates related to equity concerns about the workplace size requirement continue. For instance, on 19 June 2017, a legislative initiative requesting to eliminate restrictions based on workplace size was submitted to Congress (Lee, 2017) .
It should also be noted that there is the potential for this debate to go beyond the issue of equity. In fact, the result that the Durunuri programme may be an important policy tool to enrol the low-skilled population in social insurance schemes implies that there may be additional indirect economic benefits to the programme which were not considered during the process of planning. For example, since receiving social security benefits has been shown to reduce poverty rates (Kang, 2011; Seok, 2010) , one may speculate about indirect benefits associated with reduced spending on social programmes for the poor. Of course, a thorough investigation on both the shortand long-run effects of the Durunuri programme on poverty reduction would be necessary to draw any definitive conclusion.
Finally, from a policy perspective, the inclusion of the national health insurance programme in the Durunuri benefits may be warranted. As is shown in Table 2 , roughly a third of workers in small workplaces (i.e., fewer than five employees) are not subscribed to three (i.e., employment insurance, national health insurance and national pension) among the four most typical social insurance programmes in Korea. Given that the Durunuri programme targets only the national pension and employment insurance programmes, low-wage employees are left exposed to risks related to illness and health problems without any social protection. This is even more problematic given the recent rising trend in the cost of outpatient care per visit for the bottom quintile income group in Korea.
5 Specifically, although the average cost of outpatient care per visit rose by 6.7% from 2008 to 2013, the increase was 13.4% for the bottom quintile income group whereas it was 21.3% for the top quintile income group. Not surprisingly, it appears that the proportion of medical spending in Korean household expenditure data has been increasing since the early 2000s. For example, medical care expenditure accounts for 6.8% of the average monthly household expenditure in 2015, an increase from 5.8% in 2003 (Yoo, 2016) . These statistics indicate that without proper governmental support or intervention, low-income households are at greater risk of falling into poverty because of health reasons. As such, the suggestion to include the national health insurance programme in the Durunuri subsidies has been made by other scholars (Kim, 2012) .
Currently, the Moon administration (2017-present) has reportedly been pursuing the inclusion of the national health insurance programme in the Durunuri subsidies, yet the exact level of coverage and timing of initiation have yet to be declared (Yonhapnews, 2017) . Given that the expansion of the programme will incur additional costs, more research as well as a rigorous cost-benefit analysis should be conducted for the creation of a sustainable programme (Kim, 2016) . If current considerations to expand the coverage of the Durunuri programme entail a need to contain programme costs, possible options may include providing differential assistance by one's level of monthly salary as well as taking into consideration the number of working hours (Kim, 2016; Lee et al., 2014) . Such institutional changes would not only improve the efficiency of the programme but could also maximise effectiveness by reducing issues of moral hazard.
